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Abstract 
The main aim of the text is to show how a game of Go (Weiqi, baduk, Igo) can serve as a 
model representation of the ontological-metaphysical aspect of the actor–network theory 
(ANT). An additional objective is to demonstrate in return that this ontological-meta-
phys⁠ical aspect of ANT represented on Go/Weiqi game model is able to highlight the key 
aspect of this theory—onto-methodological praxis. 
Keywords: games; Go/Weiqi; empirical metaphysics; ontological imagination;  
the actor–network theory (ANT); studies on science and technology (STS). 
 
1. Introduction  
The primary aim of the article is to show how the game of Go can be used as a model to 
represent the ontological and metaphysical aspect of the actor–network theory (ANT). An 
additional aim is to show and highlight the crucial for this theory, ontomethodological as-
pect of praxis (Kuszyk-Bytniewska, 2015; Skórzyńska, 2017). The actor–network theory 
(ANT) is a representative of a more general trend in social sciences and humanities, known 
as the ontological turn (Heur van, Leydesdorff, & Wyatt, 2013). The specific language of 
this theory and the requirement to be familiar with the anthropology of laboratory tradition 
as well as Science and Technology Studies makes it difficult to become more recognizable 
by more traditional philosophical approaches. The references to the STS and Bruno Latour 
often blocks the reception in a purely philosophical field, due to his entanglement in the so-
called Science Wars (Kazibut, 2013; Tuchańska, 2006). The representatives of the ANT 
Adam W. Nowak 
102 
(M. Callon, J. Law, B. Latour, A. Mol) are labelled as constructivism, postmodernism, 
which makes the reception of the philosophical and ontological potential of their concepts 
in the field of “pure” philosophy difficult, despite some attempts (Bińczyk, Derra, & 
Grygieńć, 2015). The activity of researchers associated with the so-called speculative real-
ism does not facilitate the reception of it either, and this applies in particular to Graham 
Harman (Harman, 2009). Although they introduce the ANT to the “parlours” of philosophy, 
it is, in my opinion, a very specific and controversial interpretation of the ANT at the same 
time, i.e. the one that focus mainly at the speculative and metaphysical level of analysis. 
The achievements of Latour and other representatives of the actor–network theory are not 
based on speculation but on translation between ethnographical sensitivity which focuses 
on concrete, grounded research and philosophical boldness which allows for philosophical 
(ontological) conclusions. In this approach which emphasizes praxis, the philosophical 
work (based on a research disposition called ontological imagination) allows for (re)con-
structing “metaphysical landscapes” owing to the data collected from “actors” and not only 
as part of speculation in the researcher’s mind (Nowak, 2013, 2016, pp. 254–265). 
The use of the reference to Go/Weiqi allows showing the most important ontological and 
metaphysical characteristics of the ANT and presenting the simultaneous co-constitution 
of methodological practices with the stabilization of the world (ontology) important to this 
approach (Law, 2004). I can legitimately apply the reference to Go/Weiqi for several rea-
sons: firstly, this reference appears in key moments of the work by Bruno Latour himself 
(Latour, 2005; Latour & Woolgar, 1986, pp. 247–252) and earlier by Deleuze and Guattari 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Secondly, the shifting of the emphasis from reproducing au-
thors’ texts from the ANT to showing the “work” of the theory, illustrated by the reference 
to the game, makes it possible to grasp the praxis characteristic of this theory mentioned 
above. Thirdly, the focus on the story about the game and its recreation breaks with the 
theory-centric way of narrating, i.e. translating philosophical approaches produced as the-
ories through other theoretical approaches. This is especially important because the ANT 
is a theory-praxis, a way of “enacting” rather than a classical theory. Therefore, in the case 
of the ANT, it is essential to practise the research rather than to talk about it only. A phi-
losopher who “plays the ANT” learns a certain theory-praxis, the result of which is re-
vealed only after “playing the game.” Using different, more dedicated language, I want to 
show in the following article how to understand the ANT as ontomethodology (Law, 2004) 
and ontography (Lynch, 2013)—a methodological and ontological study which is estab-
lished in conjunction with the examined object (Law, 2004). 
 
2. Text Structure, Technical and Terminological Notes 
Text structure: After the introduction, in the next part of the article, I will discuss the 
actor–network theory as a distinct non-reductive method of philosophizing (onto-method-
ology). Further, I will outline how Go/Weiqi has been used as a model so far. Then, by 
comparison with chess, I would like to point out that the ontological programme embodied 
and articulated in the rules and practice of playing Go is fundamentally different from the 
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ontological tradition in Europe. I will discuss it in more detail in the next section of the text. 
In another one, entitled Playing as the Changing of the World, I will demonstrate how the 
game of Go and the ANT ontomethodology can be described in parallel as an expression 
of a similar philosophical program. In the final part entitled Game and the ontology of 
choice, I will briefly outline the ethical and axiological consequences of this programme.  
Go/Weiqi: In most cases, I will use this double notation mainly to emphasize the Chinese 
origin of this game, often known only through its significance in Japanese culture. There 
are other names for this game: igo (jap.) and baduk in Korea. 
ANT: In the text, I will use the commonly accepted abbreviation, the ANT, to specify the 
actor–network theory. 
STS: I will use this abbreviation to describe Science Technology Studies. 
Ontological imagination: It is the philosophical paraphrase of Mills’ sociological imagi-
nation and its adaptation to posthumanistic ontology. To be endowed with an ontological 
imagination means to be capable of performing an ontological analysis, which allows rec-
ognizing and potentially transforming networks of actors, configurations of beings 
through which our reality is stabilized, as experienced by individuals within liferworlds 
(Nowak, 2016). 
Empirical metaphysics: In the text, I will use this expression referring to the so-called 
ontological turn (Heur van et al., 2013). Despite the relatively “young age” of the research 
field itself, (the STS is 30–40 years old), the very idea of an analogical concept of empirical 
metaphysics or ontology reaches Whitehead and Nietzsche (Law & Lien, 2013, p. 363). 
Although the STS tradition usually employs the term “empirical ontology” (Law & Lien, 
2013; Woolgar & Pawluch, 1985), the terms “new empiricism” in reference to Latour 
(Krarup & Blok, 2011) and “empirical philosophy” are also often used (Latour, 2008). I 
decided to use the term “empirical metaphysics” consistently in the text, although I must 
admit that the interchangeable use of the term “empirical ontology” is justified. My decision 
was mainly based on the fact that I refer primarily to the most philosophical work by Bruno 
Latour entitled Irreductions (Latour, 1988) and not to more empirical works in the field of 
actor–network theory, keeping the term ontology for specific empirical applications of this 
method of philosophising. What is “empirical metaphysics” in the tradition that I find in-
teresting, and which I also accept in this text, is well illustrated by the following quote: 
In Latour’s view, not engaging in metaphysics means taking on the moderns’ misinterpreta-
tion of their own world and inheriting their disastrous practices of exploitation of the planet. 
The positive political hope is placed on a study of “what there is and what it is like” which 
is empirical but not naively so, aimed at collective, pragmatic, and concrete renegotiations 
of what we take to be the fundamental conditions of our existence. Thus, Latour’s metaphys-
ical apparatus is aimed at providing an ontological toolkit ready at hand for continuously, in 
each new empirical as well as philosophical inquiry, reopening the question of what there is 
and what is important (Hämäläinen & Lehtonen, 2016, p. 14)  
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3. Non-Reductive Methodo-Ontology of Actor–Network Theory 
Let me start with a strong statement: the actor–network theory has not been sufficiently 
introduced into philosophical debates. This may seem paradoxical, given how commonly 
we can find references to it, especially to Bruno Latour. However, what I believe attracts 
attention is a few “fashionable expressions” such as: non-humans, rhizome, net, turn to 
objects, agency of things, objects, etc, which are taken out of this tradition and used to 
embellish humanistic articles. In the following text, I make assumptions the same as I 
made in my book (Nowak, 2016), namely, that the fundamental philosophical core of the 
ANT presented by Latour in his Irreductions is relatively unknown (Latour, 1988). In this 
text written in points, similar to the Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 
structure, Latour presents his ontological-metaphysical programme and, exceptionally, 
does so directly. This was quite unique at that time, as Latour the philosopher was usually 
hidden in the shadow of Latour the anthropologist of science. The Irreductions are not an 
independent publication either, but they constitute the second part of a book entitled The 
Pasteurization of France (in a widely known English translation, while the original title 
was Les Microbes. Guerre et paix, suivi de Irréductions). Latour’s philosophical pro-
gramme gave the background for works on the boundaries of ethnography, laboratory, and 
STS, until the book An inquiry into modes of existence (Latour, 2013), which is an attempt 
to summarize and integrate both philosophical and “empirical” themes of his work, was 
published. In this text I will focus on the treatise entitled Irreductions due to its more 
analytical character. Latour the philosopher is slowly gaining popularity and in this sense 
my text is following a growing trend. In this context, it is worth reading the biographical-
intellectual portrait of Latour drawn by Henning Schmidgen (Schmidgen, 2015). How-
ever, let us come back to discussing the treatise itself. It is important to me that, as Knorr 
Cetina put it, in Irreductions Latour formulates a theory similar to that by Nietzsche, ac-
cording to which politics and struggle permeate the whole reality (Knorr-Cetina, 1985, 
p. 581), and which is more visible in the original French title of his book referring to Tol-
stoy. The “war” core is not a socio-political “overlay” on the “ontological” subsoil, but it 
is closely connected with Latour’s ontological-metaphysical proposal. He does not sepa-
rate types of entities and spheres of reality, but in Irreductions he tries to philosophically 
capture the mystical experience, which, as he himself confesses, was a kind of epiphany 
for him (Latour, 1988, p. 163; Nowak, 2016, pp. 233–244). Latour describes the situation 
when, as a young philosophy teacher, he had to stop his car when coming back from work 
because he experienced something overwhelming—the reality revealed itself to him as 
completely unreduced, none of the experienced things were inscribed in causal sequences, 
relations of dependencies, the results were suspended. As he says himself: 
“Nothing can be reduced to anything else, nothing can be deduced from anything else, eve-
rything may be allied to everything else.” This was like an exorcism that defeated demons 
one by one. It was a wintry sky, and a very blue. […]. I added it to other skies in other places 
and reduced none of them to it, and it to none of them. It “stood at arm’s length,” fled, and 
The Burden of Choice, the Complexity of the World and Its Reduction 
105 
established itself where it alone defined its place and its aims, neither knowable nor unknow-
able. It and me, them and us, we mutually defined ourselves. And for the first time in my life 
I saw things unreduced and set free (Latour, 1988, p. 163)  
The experience described by Latour can be compared to Heidegger’s proposition of the 
Gelassenheit, namely, “allowing things to be” (Heidegger, 1966), or similar to being sub-
merged in existence on the same pattern as the religious experience described by William 
James (James, 2004, pp. 67–68). Experience, epiphany, is the beginning of Latour’s phil-
osophical work; in his treatise he simultaneously not only tries to reconstruct the world, to 
reassemble it, but also shows how it is possible to simultaneously exist in both the “unre-
duced” world experienced in epiphany, as well as the world experienced every day in its 
already always reduced form. In Irreductions, he proposes an initial version of the onto-
method, an ontological procedure which will then be developed by other researchers from 
the ANT circle, including John Law (Law, 2004). It consists in procedural, methodological 
suspension of current causal relations, states of reality and then, with the help of detailed 
and empirical work (based on a “dense description,” radical ethnographic method), tracing 
how the world has been reduced to the form with which we currently encounter. The 
Latour Program, despite its apparent novelty, is an ontological version of Husserl’s 
epoche. In early Husserl, epoche meant “suspension,” “hanging up” of sense-creating 
judgments within the work of the mind. In the case of late Husserl and within the phenom-
enological sociology that was a continuation of his research (Schutz, Berger, Luckmann), 
the sense-making matrix that established the horizon of meaning was no longer solely a 
soliptically closed mind, but the lifeworld—Lebenswelt. In this case, epoche meant the 
ability to “suspend” the current cultural and social rules determining the field of meaning 
and to analyse the very constitution of this field (Abriszewski, 2016). In Irreductions, 
Latour proposes an analogous procedure; the essential difference is that the procedure does 
not stop at the traditional division into a world of the subject and the object world 
(“things”) defined by Neo-Kantianism. Phenomenological sociology, although it consid-
ered the role of “things” in the constitution of the horizon of meaning (Lebenswelt) as 
fundamentally asymmetrical was limited to the analysis of the human and social world. 
Latour’s radicalism goes beyond this post-Kantian binarism and shows that this binarism 
is just another way in which “the world has been reduced.” 
Despite the baroque language, in Irreductions Latour offers a very simple set of basic rules 
which allow reconstructing its approach to reality. It is worth noting that this simplicity 
may be misleading; it only determines the basic methodological and ontological assump-
tions to be adopted when researching how the world “reduces” itself, i.e. how it stabilizes 
the very version of reality that has occurred. Experiencing the “epiphany” or performing a 
purely speculative, philosophical operation of an ontologized epoche, we are aware that this 
reduction is only one of the possible forms of reality (the one that prevailed) was consti-
tuted. This corresponds to the Nietzschean character of Latour’s philosophy that has been 
derived from Deleuze (Deleuze, 2002; Knorr-Cetina, 1985, 1985; Latour, 1988, p. 251). 
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Therefore, we should examine the underlying concepts of his ontomethodology:  
1. Every being, human and non-human, is irreducible, and is manifested in its existence 
and cannot be reduced or derived from another being. 
2. Everything is relational because actors/actants constantly enter into alliances, and they 
are the assemblages that create reality.  
3. Actors in a priori research are presented as concrete, non-reducible entities; this as-
sumption results from the methodological postulate of radical symmetry. It means that we 
do not anticipate, do not impose any prejudgements of the examined reality concerning 
the properties of entities, unless we derive them from the onto-methodological analysis.  
4. However, this does not apply to the already existing Wholes which are composed of 
collectives; they are, at the same time, treated as non-reductive when we think of them as 
a black boxed entity but also historical when we think of them as already formed assem-
blages through the process of creating alliances of other entities. 
 
By reformulating it, we can summarise it as follows:  
1. The world is constituted by actors/actors. They are equivocal, and defined by their 
agency understood as the ability to compose reality.  
2. Principle of non-reduction (irreduction). No a priori object, on the basis of some 
predetermined principle, is reduced to another one. There is no metaphysical frame of 
reference that would be privileged over other frames. Irreduction is the postulate from 
which we begin to study the plexuses of given collectives, assemblages. In other words, 
we assume the world as unreduced at the “input,” but not at the “output” of a given philo-
sophical research process in the very idea of the actor–network theory. Thus, on the one 
hand, no object can be reduced to another (by the researcher-philosopher with the power 
of the apodictic work of reason), but, at the same time, the experience of everyday life is 
nothing more than experiencing the reduction that took place at the constitution of this 
very state of reality. 
3. Translation is the way in which the process of self-reduction of the world is occurring. 
It can be understood as a radical suppression of hypostasis. The causal factors, agency, 
actors, in Latour, Law or Mol’s view must always be shown by reference to an “indicator,” 
the marker. If, in the study, you are not able to demonstrate the indicator on the basis of 
which you apply for a given impact, you are necessarily doomed to ontological agnosti-
cism. This task is difficult because, with the reduction of the world, its past states are 
hidden, become transparent, and the work (agency) and relations that caused its current 
state become invisible (Star, 1999, p. 381). Advancing the course of the storyline which 
can be observed by analysing the board of the completed game of Go/Weiqi we can see 
the formation of stones (pieces), we can decide who won, but the game itself, its history, 
is largely hidden from us. Revealing the invisible work of causality in already constituted 
assemblages is, in my opinion, the key aspect of the ANT, more important than the more 
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familiar narrative of the dichotomy of human and non-human. The indication of transla-
tion emphasizes the key aspect of the ANT which is the analysis of stabilizing, sustaining, 
and destabilizing the order identical to the momentary, transient but currently binding state 
of the experienced reality. The actor–network theory allows us to reconstruct and disman-
tle the complex networks of actors (as mediators) that have allowed our world to emerge, 
to stabilize it, but what is more, it allows us to see the invisible effort (work) that had to 
be put into this stabilization, the creation of the network, and shows the externalised costs 
of this process (Abriszewski, 2008). 
4. Actors are not weak or strong through an inner being, but they gain strength or 
weakness through relationships and their allies. Also in this aspect the Nietzschean 
character of Latour’s philosophical system reveals itself (Knorr-Cetina, 1985). In his view, 
the world is full of negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and violence, 
owing to which an actor or force grants itself power, or causes it to be given to them to 
speak or act in the name of another actor or force. Alliances is the name for the existence 
of beings understood in a radical relational way if we abandon the assumption of a 
“deeper” being; alliances are the only ways to acquire properties by beings and to build 
larger entities. There are no potential properties in a strong sense, i.e. features that would 
survive despite the relationship. Interconnecting actors and establishing networks means 
acquiring reality and power. Existence is a derivative of the number and quality of con-
nections: “1.1.5. Whatever resists trials is real.” (Latour, 1988, p. 158). The danger of 
Latour’s ontology reveals itself here—it is a metaphysical version of Darwinism and cor-
responds to its expression in Nietzsche’s thought. It assumes a similar definition of exist-
ence visible in the tautological principle of survival of the fittest. This exists what is best 
suited to the state of the world, and we know about it because this “something” would not 
exist if it had not been adapted. Such an ontologically approach causes many problems 
with axiology (Nowak, 2015) showing at the same time another aspect of comparison be-
tween the ANT and the game of Go/Weiqi used as war simulation (Boorman, 1969; Lai, 
2004; Wasik & Cynarski, 2005). 
 
4. GO as a Metaphor and Model 
The fundamental difficulty associated with the main idea of the text is the possibility that 
it will be endangered with the risk of an ignotum per ignotum error, I will explain here a 
relatively unknown philosophical system referring to the equally little-known game 
Go/Weiqi. However, I dare to make this attempt because both the actor–network theory 
illustrated with reference to a non-theoretical reality, an interesting example of which is 
the use of LEGO blocks to illustrate an atomistic ontology (Maddalena, 2014) and the 
game of Go/Weiqi, were used to illustrate theoretical and philosophical ideas, for example 
the concepts underpinning Mao Tse-Tung’s action during the partisan war (Boorman, 
1969) or, more broadly, the policies of the People’s Republic of China (Lai, 2004). The 
cultural importance of Go/Weiqi in China and neighbouring countries is significant (Mos-
kowitz, 2013, pp. 14–30) as it affects literature, philosophy, politics, and gender roles. 
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Playing Go/Weiqi also shows a religious and mystical dimension in both China and Japan 
(Moskowitz, 2013, pp. 34–42).  
For a Polish reader, is the book entitled Świat Go by Janusz Kraszek (Kraszek, 2008) is a 
good introduction. On account of a still relatively weak presence of Go in the Polish con-
text1. I will first reconstruct the rules of the game and then show examples of using the 
game in Go as a model for different aspects of reality.  
A Go/Weiqi set consists of 180 black and 180 white pieces called stones. Unlike chess 
figures, the stones in Go are equally “valuable” and have the same properties. In a more 
appropriate way, one could say that they do not have any properties to the same extent. 
The board (goban) for playing Go is composed of 19 lines crossing vertically and hori-
zontally. On the board, there are highlighted places called stars (hoshi). They are important 
when playing with handicaps, but they do not differ in essence from other intersections.  
The picture represents an exemplary dia-
gram showing the game of Go. In this 
case, the game of the master of Go, 
Honinbo Shusaku. https://pl.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Go. 
The aim of the game is to conquer terri-
tory with as little loss as possible. The 
game is designed for two players. The 
stones are placed alternately at crossroads, 
intersections of lines. There are some very 
simple rules that describe the game. We 
can lay one stone at a time, at an intersec-
tion. Stones merge into chains if they 
oc⁠cupy adjacent fields. When the stones 
are adjacent to an empty intersection, they 
have the so-called breath. Lack of an 
empty crossroad, breathing, causes the 
stone to be “dead,” and we remove it from the board. The aim of the game is to create such 
structures out of stones that “survive” and, at the same time, allow occupying the largest 
portion of the board with the slightest loss of their own stones. In the game, there are a few 
more small additional rules which do not need to be discussed for the purpose of this text. 
When you look at the game, it at first seems to be less complicated and interesting than 
chess, but when you start playing it, it turns out that it exceeds the complexity of chess 
many times over. Therefore, it is impossible to comprehend and plan the whole game on 
the basis of only a “computational” approach and analysis of one specific problem. Due 
                                                          
1 A short history of Go in Poland and a list of books and publications can be found on the website of the Polish 
go player association: http://biblioteka.go.art.pl/taxonomy/term/3. 
Figure 1. Diagram of the game of the master  
of Go, Honinbo Shusaku. 
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to their openness and the possibility of multi-directional development of the game, players 
constantly have to switch their attention from one part of the board to another. At the same 
time, they make tactical decisions concerning playing, i.e. building local structures, as well 
as holistically plan the development of the whole game. The game consists of three tradi-
tionally specified phases: opening (fuse), middle phase (chuban) and final phase (yose). In 
the traditional parts, setting up approximately the first dozen of moves is crucial as it de-
termines the spheres of influence. Often, it takes more time than the other parts of the 
game. However, this is the second, middle phase of the game which is most difficult. In 
this part of the game, most depends on intuition and internalized skills, as opposed to the 
initial and final phase which can be codified to a greater extent.  
 
5. Chess and Go/Weiqi—Playing and Embodiment of (Different) Ontologies 
The faithful commandment: “Follow the actor” I make a comparison between Go and the 
ANT boldly emboldened by findings, indicators found in Latour’s work itself. In Irreduc-
tions, he evokes a novel entitled Meijin—The master of Go (Kawabata, 1973) in his thesis:  
1.1.11 Everything is still at stake. However, since many players are trying to make the game 
irreversible and doing everything they can to ensure that everything is not equally possible, 
the game is over. Homage to the Master of Go.2 (Latour, 1988, p. 160) 
This fragment is preceded by an indication that each actor’s action leaves a trace, history, 
action and creates an asymmetry which also leaves a trace, influences the state of reality 
that emerges from the fight; the losers and the winners will assemble the resulting shape 
of the fight. The reference to Go in such an important place of the Latourian philosophical 
treatise is not only an ornament, but also an important interpretive suggestion. I attach 
great importance to it because I consider Latour to be an author who, like Heidegger, blurs 
his footprints like a fox with his tail. Latour constructs his texts so that the reader has an 
impression of originality and novelty, and thus, references to intellectual inspiration are 
often hidden. An example that reveals this strategy is the text Visualization and Cognition: 
Drawing things Together (Latour, 2012) in which Latour showed his intellectual inspira-
tions (Toronto school, Orality/ Literacy Theory). Interestingly, the original text was pub-
lished in 1986 and, in later works by Latour, there is little reference to these traditions. 
Assuming this specificity of the author, I believe that the scattered minor remarks con-
cerning the game of Go have a much greater qualitative significance in the reconstruction 
of Latour’s philosophical system than the number of references would indicate. 
Being at the same time a reader of Latour and Law and having experience in playing Go, 
I find it apparent that the “empirical metaphysics,” which is founded and then embodied, 
and then performed within this game is the practice of the basic philosophical principles 
contained in the Irreductions. The strangeness and specificity of the ANT language lies, 
                                                          
2 In the Polish version of my article I referred to the Polish translation of Kawabata’s novel, it is also in the 
bibliography, Latour’s translation referred to the English edition from 1972. 
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amongst other things, in its difference from the “standard Euro-American metaphysics” 
(Law, 2004), a good example of which can be the Aristotelian system or, more generally, 
ontotheological systems (Kostyszak, 2010). For this reason, it will be convenient to illus-
trate the Latour system by intertwining it with the metaphor of the game of Go and juxta-
posing it with the so-called standard metaphysics illustrated by the metaphor of the game 
of chess. Such a comparison is often used and is a variant of a more general comparison 
between the “East-West mentality” together with the potential Eurocentric and political 
burden of such a procedure (Moskowitz, 2013, pp. 30–34). 
Chess is deeply metaphysical. The various pieces have powers or abilities and the player’s task 
is to get them into the ideal circumstances in which they can manifest them. A rook, for in-
stance, could dominate many spaces on the board but begins with its power held back, trapped 
within a wall of its own colour. The power of a piece can be understood in terms of the possi-
bilities it has available if unhindered. A queen threatens more squares than a pawn; yet even a 
little pawn in the right situation can play an important role. Most of the game possibilities go 
unactualised. Each move closes off old possibilities and creates new ones. If one wants to un-
derstand a metaphysics of causal powers, chess is a good place to start. (Mumford, 2013) 
In the above quotation, one can clearly see the embodiment of Aristotle’s metaphysics in 
the rules of playing chess. Figures have certain properties, forms. These forms are poten-
tial, waiting in sleep; updating is possible thanks to various configurations; they create 
new dynamic (in the sense of dynamism!) compositions. Some aspects of the figures are 
emphasized, others are moved to the background. In some situations, it is important that 
the queen has the ability to move around the board, in others that she beats in every direc-
tion. In the case of pawns, it is important that they beat diagonally, and in others that, after 
reaching the last field, they can be exchanged for any other figure (except for the king). 
Chess figures, therefore, have a clearly defined core, the essence, but they are subject to 
considerable modification dependent on the relationships in which they participate. These 
relations, however, are only updates of potency. In this sense, the world of chess, just like 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, despite its dynamics and variability, does not allow for the mo-
ment of emptiness and creation. Let’s now move on to the reconstruction of the game of 
chess and Go in the Treaty on Nomadology (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 351–423) This 
will allow, on the one hand, capturing the differences between the two games in philo-
sophical terms and, on the other hand, showing the link between rhizomatics and the the-
ory of the actor–network and the game of Go: 
Let us take a limited example and compare the war machine and the State apparatus in the 
context of the theory of games. Let us take chess and Go, from the standpoint of the game 
pieces, the relations between the pieces and the space involved. Chess is a game of State, or 
of the court: the emperor of China played it. Chess pieces are coded; they have an internal 
nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and confrontations 
derive. They have qualities; a knight remains a knight, a pawn a pawn, a bishop a bishop. Each 
is like a subject of the statement endowed with a relative power, and these relative powers 
combine in a subject of enunciation, that is, the chess player or the game’s form of interiority. 
Go pieces, in contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only an anonymous, 
collective, or third-person function:. “It” makes a move. “It” could be a man, a woman, a 
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louse, an elephant. Go pieces are elements of a nonsubjectified machine assemblage with no 
intrinsic properties, only situational ones. Thus the relations are very different in the two cases. 
Within their milieu of interiority, chess pieces entertain biunivocal relations with one another, 
and with the adversary’s pieces: their functioning is structural. On the other hand, a Go piece 
has only a milieu of exteriority, or extrinsic relations with nebulas or constellations, according 
to which it fulfills functions of insertion or situation, such as bordering, encircling, shattering. 
All by itself, a Go piece can destroy an entire constellation synchronically; a chess piece can-
not (or can do so diachronically only). (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 352–353) 
The above quotation outlines a metaphysical dispute, which takes place in an ontological 
process enacted by the both games. The world of Latour, so well described by the rules 
and practice of playing Go, is completely different from the one presented in chess. Instead 
of the metaphysics of form and matter we are dealing with rhizome. It is also visible in the 
differences in strategic and tactical training that chess and Go players gain (Boorman, 
1969, pp. 4–7). In classical Western war thought, it was crucial to win battles quickly, to 
strive for direct confrontation with the use of an overwhelming number of military units 
designed to overcome the opponent’s resistance. In the Chinese (and Japanese) tradition, 
playing Go/Weiqi has shaped the war imagination (strategic and tactical) of both generals 
and politicians over centuries (Moskowitz, 2013, pp. 42–47) the traces of which can be 
found both in The Art of War and in the works of Mao Zedong. According to Hong Feng 
notes quoted by Moskowitz: 
In ancient China they had a book to teach people to play Weiqi that was forbidden by the 
government because Weiqi is like a war. People are very smart so if they knew how to play 
this game they would know strategies that they could be used to fight against the government. 
Along the same lines, a library reference catalogue placed Weiqi books next to Sunzi’s Art 
of War. In Sunzi’s Art of War there is one war strategy where he said you can win a war 
without actually fighting. This is the highest form of battle. This being polite and avoids the 
road of killing. Weiqi also has a strategy like this. (Moskowitz, 2013, p. 42) 
The above remarks can be found in the actions of Mao during the Chinese liberation war. 
In his writings from that period he directly referred to the inspi ration of Go/Weiqi (Boor-
man, 1969, p. 6), and indirect action aimed at prolonging the conflict, focused on shaping 
relations, networks, rather than on solving individual battles was the key for him: 
Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement 
by our own—rather like a game of weichi Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides 
resemble the capturing of each other’s pieces, and the establishment of enemy strongholds 
(such as Taiyuan) and our guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai Mountains) resembles 
moves to dominate spaces on the board. (Mao, 1965, p. 147) 
Chess requires the resolution of tensions between the existing qualities (figures), while the 
game of Go requires the simultaneous creation of structures which thus obtain “quality” 
and interplay of tensions between them. Playing Go teaches thinking as managing bound-
ary conditions that cause the states of things to take on a given shape, and not so important 
in the ontotheology of investigating the essence of things: 
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Ten years after the publication of “On Protracted War,” Mao once again used tern1inology 
reminiscent of wei-ch’i. In his can1paign directive regarding final operations against the Na-
tionalists in the north China theater in late 1948, entitled in his Selected Military Writings 
“The Concept of Operations for the Peiping- Tientsin Campaign,” Mao said, “If these two 
points, Tangku ( the most important) and Hsinpao-an, are captured, you will have the initia-
tive on the whole chessboard.” The Chinese idiom used by Mao at the end of this sentence 
is “ch’iian-chii chieh huo-le,” in literal translation, “the whole situation will be living,” an 
expression which sounds bizarre to the Western reader but which corresponds to a common 
wei-ch’i idiom (Boorman, 1969, p. 7) 
A reference to Mao, Deleuze, and Guattari allowed us to show the transitions between 
philosophical models, war practices, and a game of Go/Weiqi. It is worth mentioning that 
the language of Mao Zedong’s metaphors is also present in fragments of Latour, Deleuze, 
and Guattari’s works not directly related to the game of Go/Weiqi, it is worth noticing that 
Mao’s refence to big areas and little areas (massifs, plateaus in Polish translations) as 
points diffusing resistance which founds structural resemblance in the title of Thousands 
of Plateau (Mao, 1965, p. 147). Unfortunately, a closer analysis of this relationship goes 
beyond the framework of this text, although it remains intriguing that Deleuze, and Guat-
tari in their analysis of the partisan war (“nomadic war machine”) explicitly refer to the 
Bedouin tactics described by Lawrence in The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Deleuze & Guat-
tari, 1987, p. 416) and do not mention Mao (Thoburn, 2008, 2013).  
At this point, I will abandon further development of these analogies and move on to show 
the parallels between playing Go and the actor–network theory in more detail. “Empirical 
metaphysics,” i.e. an ontological proposal whose embodiment is Go, is fascinating. On the 
one hand, we are dealing with a set of very simple rules. Neither stones nor intersec-
tions/crossings have properties. This means that it is only during the game, during the 
construction of the formation, that their properties are revealed. Playing is not about link-
ing “ready-made rules” and detecting relations between them, but it is much more com-
plex. At the same time, we construct the whole (stone formations), we recognize their 
properties (as formations, resulting from the properties of an assemblage) and the relations 
between assemblages (formations), and we also have to consider the game environment, 
i.e. the board and its spatial properties. They are not treated in Cartesian as an abstract 
space, but as a qualitatively significant place (Tuan, 1987). The properties of the formation 
of stones are treated similarly, constituted each time with emerging structures, and not 
assigned “permanently” to stones or the board. Although initially the number of rules is 
smaller than in chess, during the game, the number of configurations, the possibilities of 
evolution of given structures is huge. Learning to play the game of Go, on the one hand, 
is to practise what we can call tactical or pattern-reading skills. It is the ability to see the 
dynamics of a developing system after just two or three movements. These systems have 
been codified in subject literature for hundreds of years, from the simplest so-called “lad-
der” or “crane” to the more complex ones, often traditionally attributed to masters who 
were supposed to have invented them.  
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The second skill is closely related to the ability to “read” the whole board, to understand 
the meaning, the direction of development of the game. It is the ability to take a holistic 
and strategically key view of the whole complexity of the game in a certain phenomeno-
logical perspective. Importantly, in the world of Go players, the ability to play the game 
is not limited to the technical skills of the game since it also includes a certain holistic 
code of conduct while playing. Kraszek lists, among other things, examples of such rules: 
players should not rest their heads on their elbows, hold their stones while thinking, etc. 
They should not go against what is called “the spirit of Go” (Kraszek, 2008, p. 32). These 
rules are just as important in teaching Go/Weiqi as a purely technical mastery of game 
skills. Moskovitz also points to the emerging tension between the classic Confucian ideal 
embodied and practised in Go/Weiqi and the contemporary requirements of corporate pro-
fessional structures of sports clubs (Moskowitz, 2013, pp. 77–80). 
 
6. Placing Stones—Playing Go as Enacting and Embodying Ontology 
Therefore, we will give a deeper insight into the “ontology of the game” itself; just like in 
the ANT assumptions, there are actors (stones), the causative, their mutual relations. Alli-
ances determine the spheres of what is possible. The world is a field of play of forces 
which, in turn, result from the configuration and alliances of actors. The ontology of play-
ing Go/Weiqi is as “flat” as the one adopted within the framework of the actor–network 
theory. The ANT, like the game of Go/Weiqi (and its internal ontology), is both simple (at 
the level of rules setting) and extremely complex (at the level of the received image/model 
of reality). What is particularly important to me is the fact that playing it is treated in China 
and Japan like life practice, a meditative one, connected respectively with Confucian phi-
losophy (Moskowitz, 2013, pp. 72–74) and the concept of the Way (Dao/Do). Thus, play-
ing the game is, at the same time, performing the game, practising a certain logical-
philosophical model, lifestyle, and spiritual practice. Such a multi-faceted approach can 
be described in a reduced way as “performance” (enactment) “playing the game of the 
game.” The above mentioned motives referring to the concept of the Way (Do) (Cynarski, 
2000) and Confucian ideals reveal an important and complex problem of the relationship 
between ontology and axiology, which concerns both the game of Go/Weiqi, and the cul-
tural practices inspired by it, as well as the actor–network theory (ANT).  
Feenberg is an intrinsically important reference for me since the main motive of his phil-
osophical work is analogous to my efforts. He tries to reconcile the ontological efficiency 
of the ANT and STS with the axiological dimension of classical Marxian criticism 
(Nowak, 2015, 2016). Feenberg accomplishes this by linking his studies of science and 
technology with reflections referring to Lukacs, Marcuse, and partly to Heidegger. I will 
not refer to this wide range of philosophical references and I will focus on Feenberg’s 
book in which he directly refers to philosophical aspects of the modernization of Japanese 
culture, including references to the game of Go. His analysis of the concept of the Way 
(Do) will be particularly important to me: 
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This characteristically Japanese concept of Way has a two-tiered structure. For an activity to 
support a Way, it must be abstracted from the contingencies of everyday life and constructed 
as an autonomous “field” with its own logic. Then, this field must become a locus of reflec-
tion and self-transformation for the agent engaged in activity on it. (Feenberg, 1995, p. 197)  
The dialectic relationship between field autonomy and committed in-activity is crucial to 
achieve mastery in action. As Flyvbjerg, who referring to the Dreyfus research tries to 
make the concept of prudent action (phronesis) contemporary, points out that such a cir-
cular, dialectic structure is a universal model describing the cognitive processes of acquir-
ing skills and reaching the mastery level in a selected aspect of action (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
1980; Flyvbjerg, 2001). Reconstructing the autonomous field that creates a network of 
rules of performance/game—whether in the case of the game of Go/Weiqi, or in the case 
of the ontological-philosophical projects—is the first step, the game practice itself (and its 
learning and teaching to others). So, it is important not to remain at the level of rules but 
to perform and practise it. Therefore, a comparison of the philosophical treatise Irreduc-
tions to game of GO/Weiqi shows the autonomy of the field within the “ANT game,” 
which, like the game of Go/Weiqi must become a place of reflection and self-transfor-
mation for the actor in this engaged activity (Feenberg, 1995, p. 197). It harmonizes well 
with the mythical story about the beginnings of the game of Go: 
“My master showed me that playing Go is at the same time a cruel war, a great construction 
and wise trading,” said Dan Zhu. “In order to play better I had to learn a lot and, as you saw, 
I tried to do it well.” (Lubos, 2008) 
The transformation requires simultaneous mastery of the rules of the game, its practice, and 
the transformation of the player himself. As Andrew Feenberg points out, autonomy in the 
case of Go/Weiqi game results from the following rules: moves are made according to clear, 
unambiguous rules and they are devoid of any semantic context, their goal is closely inter-
twined with the immanent rules of the game itself. The result of the game, the decision to 
win is also based on clear rules. Movements are strictly distinguished; they have their 
“place” and “time.” The autonomy of the game, its specific separation from the context and 
environment allows us to improve playing. The process of self-reflection perfected during 
the game is intertwined with the life of the player, owing to which the game does not only 
serve to improve the gameplay itself but becomes a catalyst for the player’s own transfor-
mations. The autonomization and recontextualization of the game lead to the player starting 
to act in one “non-dualistic” mode of action, previously referred to as “the Way” (Do): 
Reflection not only improves performance but also recontextualizes the autonomous game 
in the player’s life process. Play is a practice of self-realization modifying the player through 
discipline. (Feenberg, 1995, p. 198)  
The game becomes a way, a vocation, a practice of self-fulfilment. But remaining at the 
level of autonomy is not enough, it is necessary to recontextualise and immerse oneself in 
practice. Only owing to the work of translation between the discipline developed in the 
game and being in the environment is the effect of the Way achieved. This need to mediate 
the transition between the autonomous interior and the heteronomous environment was well 
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described by Latour when he described how Pasteur’s success came about (Latour, 1983, 
1988). It should be noted that the description of the victorious “war on microbes” waged 
by Pasteur, with reference to Tolstoy, is the first part of the volume in which the Treaty of 
Non-reduction is published as the second part. Latour pointed out how, on the one hand, 
the autonomy of the “laboratory” field with its specific rules, procedures, worked out and, 
on the other hand, success is possible only through the practice of recontextualization. Not 
only because a laboratory discovery should be “applicable” but, above all, because the 
whole cognitive process requires a constant transition, a translation between the autono-
mous field of the laboratory environment. Due to this, Pasteur can “pasteurize” France, i.e. 
successfully introduce the innovation of a vaccine. Pasteur could not fight direct microbes, 
he could not wage frontal war against them, but rather started partisan war in the spirit of 
Mao Zedong (Mao, 2012 (1938)), or in the style of the game of Go/Weiqi had to make a 
“protracted war,” manage boundary conditions, occupy and create stable “massifs and is-
lands,” thanks to which he could expand the effect of his influence until victory—the en-
emy’s environment and stabilization of the situation on the “board” according to his rules. 
It is clear that an important aspect of the ANT, the link between micro and macro-level 
analysis, can be seen here (Callon & Latour, 1981). Pasteur achieves success because, alike 
Mao in his guerrilla war, or a good player, he combines strategic, tactical, and ethos skills. 
The “game” principle permeates the whole of reality and allows for victory in a world de-
fined by simple Nietzschean-Darwinian rules—the winner is the version of reality that has 
stabilized and emerged from the abyss of infinite alternatives.  
Practising the game as a way is crucial for me, because it shows that it is possible to learn 
how to co-create and stabilize reality, how to influence indirectly, through a “protracted 
war,” the axiologically desired state of reality, to stabilize and have a lasting effect. On 
the one hand, the action should be based on the autonomous sphere, with its own rules; on 
the other hand, there should be a similar process of translation as in the case of the game 
of Go/Weiqi, or in the case of the discovery of the vaccine by Pasteur. 
Returning to the game of Go/Weiqi, describing the above rule may sound too metaphorical, 
but it is essential to understand the importance of practice and performance aspect of full 
involvement of immersed participation “in game.” This moment of unity of the game and 
its performance Bourdieu used to express with the term illusio. However it is important to 
keep in mind that simultaneously being “in game” is at the same time conditioned by the 
possibility of autonomy and distance. Describing game practice does not reflect what can 
be well captured when playing Go/Weiqi. The writer of these words is in the comfortable 
situation of having a Go/Weiqi player’s experience At some time, I even used to be a club 
member and took part in competitions. Taking part in a tournament celebrating the Days of 
Japan, under the auspices of the Embassy of that country was the crowning achievement of 
my short amateur career. I still remember when, during that tournament, I played with the 
master at the level of several Dan (in Go/Weiqi, because of an extensive handicap system 
such a duel is not meaningless). The master did not limit himself to the game, but com-
mented on it, teaching me and others who watched the game a specific way of thinking 
about the game. In Go/Weiqi, as I mentioned above, due to the complexity and the number 
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of potential combinations, it is not possible to remember, predict and plan moves. What is 
crucial is to learn a certain situational wisdom, which in each game allows us to recognize 
non-specific “movements,” or stone within each of the emerging game dynamics. 
Developing sensitivity to the sequence, the occurrence of a “situation,” the game of 
Go/Weiqi teaches the recognition of patterns, thinking in the style of Gestalt. During his 
commentary, the master of the game constantly referred to the metaphor of influence, 
strength and tension, as well as resistance (note how well they interact with the ANT dic-
tionary). The key to the game was to create assemblies that would be strong enough to 
survive when the player is forced to defend his position in another part of the board. The 
part of the game was a complicated theatre of forces, moments of stabilization and desta-
bilization, formation of alliances of stones that created the structure and their disintegra-
tion. While playing a single stone on the board, the master at the same time commented 
on how the stone plays with the balance of forces on the board, how it disturbs those forces. 
In the next move, the player had to face a changed balance of forces, negotiate with other 
forces, and at the same time influence the new balance of forces. Despite the fact that, for 
a layman, it might have looked like pseudo mystic remarks in the “new age” style, for a 
player, and especially for me, who not only knew the rules of the game, but was involved 
in this particular game, it was completely understandable. Unfortunately, I did not reach 
such a level of skills, I did not internalise the rules in a way that would able me to achieve 
such freedom, such an ability to “read” the board by myself. 
Practising the game, participating in this doubled game of autonomization and contextu-
alization, allows for a kind of reflectiveness that escapes the overrationalized, cephalocen-
tric analyses to follow the metaphor taken from Bourdieu. Playing Go/Weiqi allows us to 
participate in what Heidegger once again called an “event.” Let’s take a look at the “dense” 
reporter’s descriptions of the game of Go prepared by Kawabata which will allow, alt-
hough up to a minimal degree, bringing the atmosphere and specificity of the game closer 
also to those readers who have not had the opportunity to play it:  
The Master had put the match together as a work of art. It was as if the work, likened to a 
painting, were smeared black at the moment of highest tension. That play of black upon 
white, white upon black, has the intent and takes the forms of creative art. It has in it a flow 
of the spirit and a harmony as of music. Everything is lost when suddenly a false note is 
struck, or one party in a duet suddenly launches forth on an eccentric flight of his own. A 
masterpiece of a game can be ruined by insensitivity to the feelings of an adversary. That 
Black 121 having been a source of wonder and surprise and doubt and suspicion for us all, 
its effect in cutting the flow and harmony of the game cannot be denied. Black 121 was much 
discussed among the professionals of the Go world and in the larger world as well. To an 
amateur like me the play most definitely seemed strange and unnatural, and not at all pleas-
ing. But afterwards there were professionals who came forward and said that it was time for 
just such a play. (Kawabata, 1973, p. 38) 
In the quotation above (biasedly valorising the Master) one can clearly see that playing 
Go/Weiqi was a means of communication understood not as a dualizing language but as a 
transforming life practice of the players. Feenberg points out that the concept of the Way 
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(Do) is based on the concept of an “empty mind,” a way of acting based on a non-dualizing 
way of acting and speaking, specifically understood praxis.  
The doctrine of no-mind agrees that apparent dualities reveal a more fundamental unity. But 
what makes it so interesting is the elimination of the third position. Struggle itself is shown 
to be prior to the parties it joins, an underlying unity of which they are mere projections. 
True nonduality therefore cannot be achieved by observing the conflicts in which others are 
plunged, no matter how dialectically. Such an observer would still stand in dualistic opposi-
tion to an object. Rather, no-mind is a particular way of living duality, an existential position 
within it, and not a modality of knowledge transcending it (Feenberg, 1995, p. 199). 
This attempt to express the tension between dualism which necessarily appears at the level 
of language or within the structures of knowledge and the unifying role of practice is also 
visible within the framework of the actor–network theory. That is also the reason why 
Krzysztof Abriszewski compares the actor–network theory with the non-dualizing way of 
philosophizing proposed by Joseph Mitterer (Arbiszewski, 2010). I do not intend to rec-
reate Abriszewski’s analyses since for our purposes it is enough to point out that the afore-
mentioned practice of translation, so crucial within the actor–network theory, is only fully 
understood when we treat it in the same way as the above described practice of playing 
Go/Weiqi or practicing the Way (Do). Dualizing descriptions will not be fully understood 
beyond the context of practice/execution. The ANT is not a theory that only needs to be 
reconstructed. It is rather a set of rules of the game, practices that gain meaning when we 
act (we play). The simultaneous moment of practice is the only way out of the paradoxes 
in which we get entangled when the ANT is considered only as a description. 
 
7. Playing to Transform the World 
Practising the Go/Weiqi game as well as analysing in the spirit of actor–network theory 
teaches a certain attitude, a disposition that can be used as a tool for analysis and changes 
the world: 
The situation is all the more confusing because, as many anthropologists have shown, people 
devise new ‘localisms’ even faster than globalization is supposed to destroy them. Traditions 
are invented daily, entire cultures are coming into existence, languages are being made up; 
as to religious affiliations, they may become even more entrenched than before. It’s as if the 
metaphor of ‘roots’ had been turned upside down: the more ‘uprooted’ by the forces of mod-
ernization, the farther down identities are attaching themselves. Modernization, with its clear 
frontlines, has become as confusing as a game of Go at mid-play (Latour, 2005). 
We can see again a reference to the game of Go/Weiqi and the obvious use of war meta-
phors: front lines (frontlines), entreched, hence we can assume that the supposed social, 
political action is a Nietzschean war play, well described both by the “theoretical appa-
ratus” of the actor–network theory and by the metaphors taken from Go/Weiqi.  
Playing Go/Weiqi can therefore be a kind of training to develop a certain disposition, to 
teach a certain way of thinking and acting, which also allows you to practice this philo-
sophical attitude outside the game. In a sense, the game of Go/Weiqi teaches basic rules on 
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how to become an “antographer,” i.e. an ANT researcher (in a generalized version we can 
call such a researcher an “ontographer”) (Lynch, 2013) that is an explorer of ontology). I 
owe the metaphor of the “antographer” to the brilliant remark by Marcin Zarod. This met-
aphor, evoking the association with the pantograph, harmonizes well with the metaphor of 
railway tracks which is used by Latour to describe how scientific facts “circulate.” 
It is rather funny to consider that so much saliva (including mine) has been spent for or against 
a “correspondence theory of truth” by which proponents and critiques of the theory have al-
ways meant a jump between object and subject without ever inquiring about the type of cor-
respondence. Trains and subways would have offered a better metaphor for defining what we 
mean by a correspondence: you don’t shift from one subway line to the next without a contin-
uous platform and corridors laid out allowing you to correspond on schedule. So James and 
Fleck are certainly proponents of a “correspondence theory of truth” —if you keep in mind 
the train metaphor— whereas they would strongly object to the “salto mortale theory of truth”. 
If you accept renewing the metaphor, then you move forward when you go from a simple, 
isolated, poorly-equipped, and badly maintained straight line, to a complex network of well 
kept-up stations allowing for many correspondences to be established. So “forward” means 
going from a bad to a good network. 15 Anyone living in a big city with or without a good 
public transportation networks will grasp the difference (Latour, 2007, p. 96) 
Therefore, an antographer is someone who is able to connect passengers-users of 
knowledge and “tracks,” networks that determine the existence of knowledge with trains 
circulating on them—facts considering the system requirements (timetable). Antograph—
evoking the metaphors of the game of Go/ANT would be able to “read the board,” see the 
game holistically, notice tensions, flows occurring on the board (goban), observe connec-
tions between seemingly distant areas of the board. What is more, he can “switch atten-
tion” between different areas of the game, focusing on those that require intervention and 
abandoning those that “deviate.” Self-organization does not threaten the whole game. In 
this sense, Latour is right when he evokes the metaphor of playing Go in the context of 
modernization because the disposition to practise it teaches the philosophical disposition 
to un-think of a modern, Kantian provenance division into facts and values, a determined 
world of object and a subject-spiritual world of freedom. Latour, referring to the game of 
Go/Weiqi, its rules and practice, formed a specific, very hermetic alliance with those, the 
few readers who played this game. One can accuse Latour and the author of this text that 
the connection of philosophical and ontological “ANT content” with the game of 
Go/Weiqi is a kind of vain gesture, exoticism, or pseudo erudition. It is true that there are 
not many players in Go/Weiqi among the readers of the actor–network theory, but there is 
a similarly limited group of readers who have ever participated in scientific research and 
an even smaller group of readers have become ethnographers of science. I suppose that 
mastering an amateur game in Go/Weiqi requires less resources and less fees “at the en-
trance” than getting to know the functioning of scientific laboratories. In this way, as if 
through the “back door” we take a chance to have an important philosophical disposition. 
I understand the reference to the “Go/Weiqi game” as a play with the reader: “You do not 
understand the reference to this game in my text—try to play it yourself, you will 
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un⁠der⁠stand it.” This is exactly how I understand the sense of reading works on the actor–
network theory as an incentive to “play the game,” because it is only practice/performance 
that makes the ANT understandable. 
The above mentioned call to “play the game” teaches us one further lesson. It somehow 
shows that thinking and action embodied by the game can become an “ontological genera-
tor” Through an “ontological generator” I understand the factor (theory, text, social phe⁠no-
menon) which intertwines, assembles many entities, networks with each other, influences 
and changes the state of reality (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009). Such a generator can 
also be a theory, a scientific text, a popular lecture given by a scientific celebrity. Practicing 
the ANT, as I have already indicated, is not only stopping at the level of description, theory, 
but also ontological analysis of how my situated position influences the change of the mi-
crocosm (and also mezo-, macrocosm). Similarly, the game of Go/Weiqi can be treated as 
something more than its immanence, its limitation to the field of autonomy. Contextualisa-
tion mentioned above does not have to be limited only to spiritual transformation, a player’s 
self-reflection. It can be treated much more broadly. In the aforementioned novel, the party 
of Go/Weiqi, between the old master Mejin and the contender described as Onoda3, is a 
good example of such an ontological generator. The game lasted from 26 June to 4 Decem-
ber 1938 and became an event that not only shaped the lives of the players but was also 
widely commented and focused the attention of the whole Japan. This game, played with 
long breaks due to the master’s illness, was described in newspapers (Kawabata’s novel is 
a fictionalised version of his own reports from this game, printed in episodes in one of the 
newspapers). The novel clearly shows that “the game of Go/Weiqi” does not represent or 
illustrate anything (this would be impossible given its abstract character), but it is capable 
of transforming reality. Just as in the game itself, by entering into relationships, the “stones” 
create a reality with specific characteristics, so the game part itself, by entering into rela-
tions with players, spectators, fans at a distance, shapes the reality of Japan in 1938. This 
novel reveals the observation, important for the ANT, that it is possible to describe the 
transitions from how micro actors become macro actors. Kawabata’s novel is valuable on 
several levels—it is an interesting description of the game, which can itself be a model of 
Latour’s philosophical system, on the other hand it shows this “empirical metaphysics” in 
action, and shows how one can translate between the game Go/Weiqi (“the ANT model”) 
and the transformation of society through the influence of this metaphysical model sym-
bolized by the game. This is not, however, because “non-intermediate” thought has an im-
pact on reality, but because it is possible to show in a frame of a unified relational ontology 
how translation takes place, the transition between the location at the intersection of a par-
ticular colour stone and launching the whole series of transformations of the community 
which occurred in Japan in 1938. It is worth mentioning, pointing to Latour’s statement 
mentioned above, that the party between the master and pretender mentioned in the novel 
became a statement in a dispute in Japan about the modernisation of the country, defence 
of tradition, ways of carrying out (or abandoning) reforms.  
                                                          
3 True name: Kitani Minoru. 
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It may be said that the Master was plagued in his last match by modern rationalism, to which 
fussy rules were everything, from which all the grace and elegance of Go as art had disap-
peared, which quite dispensed with respect for elders and attached no importance to mutual 
respect as human beings (Kawabata, 1973, p. 12). 
The game of Go/Weiqi also becomes a matrix, which allows the author not only to present a 
discussion about the modernization of Japan, but also to speak about cultural differences; the 
author notes that in Western countries Go/Weiqi is treated only as a game, in isolation from 
the overall attitude of the Japanese who treat it as an art of life (Kawabata, 1973, p. 106).  
I am not the only one who, in the game of Go/Weiqi, is searching for a pattern, a model 
of both a certain style of philosophy and a key to Japanese culture. As I pointed out above, 
in Japan, the Go/Weiqi party described in Kawabata’s novel has become an important 
point of reference for the discussion on the ways of modernising that country. Andrew 
Feenberg in his book Alternative Modernity uses a reference to the game of Go/Weiqi in 
three aspects: he presents the game of Go/Weiqi as a metaphysical proposal, reconstructs 
discussions around the modernization of Japan and shows the proposal of the so-called 
alternative modernization. For Feenberg, the party of Master form Otake becomes a sym-
bolic duel between the old, traditional Japan and its new modernised version (Feenberg, 
1995, p. 204). He indicates that the description of the party given to us by Kawabata is a 
statement on the ways of modernising Japan similar to the diagnosis contained in the dia-
lectic approach of Nishida. This philosopher tried to reconcile the effectiveness of in-
stru⁠mental rationality embodied by Western technoscience with the Japanese cultural 
background which tried to create a coherent, harmonious organism. The reference to Ka-
wabata’s novel and drawing attention to the game of Go/Weiqi as a kind of “rational sys-
tem” allows Feenberg to metaphorically show the possibility to introduce relatively 
autonomous, non-Western modernity in Japan (Feenberg, 1995, p. 215). 
As Feenberg points out, alternative paths of modernization which, to a large extent, de-
fined the transformation in Japan, were connected, among others, with the specific cate-
gory of “place”: “This is the experience of seeking one’s «place» in the system of social 
relations in which one finds oneself” (Feenberg, 1995, p. 216). Feenberg warns against a 
hasty interpretation which links the concept of place with traditionalism and adds ideology 
to it. Rather, it indicates that this “place” should be understood as a location, a kind of 
synthesis of rationality, which does not operate in an empty world without properties. 
“Place,” location, means rather full awareness of immersion in the relative world of the 
game(s) and the awareness that rationality must be at the same time a game between the 
sphere of autonomy (formal rules) and their performance. 
 
8. Game and Ontology of Choice 
Playing Go/Weiqi, just like the theory of the actor–network, is important to me, because 
they combine a process, relativistic ontology with axiology. In the both approaches, the 
onto-methodological proposal of the ANT as in the practice of the game Go/Weiqi, the 
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ontological “burden of choice” is visible4. Each position of a stone on the board affects 
the reconfiguration of the future states of the game, but also reconfigures the past states. 
Each movement, although extremely situated, is at the same time interwoven with the 
whole game, and even, as Kawabata’s story showed, with a discussion about the fate of 
the whole nation. The combined an analysis of Go/Weiqi and the ANT games allows, in 
my opinion, getting acquainted with an important practical and theoretical disposition, 
which I call ontological imagination (Nowak, 2013, 2015). One of the crucial aspects of 
this disposition is to break with the assumption characteristic for the so-called philosophy 
of access (Harman, 2009) which assumes that ontology is something external to our life 
practice and the resulting inseparable axiological issues. The ability to think about 
Go/Weiqi from the player’s perspective, the rules of the game (its autonomy) as well as 
the weight of a single stone is the ability to abandon the assumption about the exteriority 
of ontology and think from the ontological imagination perspective. It is due to such a 
perspective that we gain a sense of importance of ontological choice. From the game of 
Go/Weiqi perspective we have to abandon the assumption about the “singularity” of the 
world (Law, 2015) and recognise the ontologically understood pluralism. This is well vis-
ible in the practice of the game. There is no tactic for one properly played game of 
Go/Weiqi. But, at the same time, there is only one actual version of this game which we 
have just finished. This corresponds well with decisions made within the framework of 
ontological turn (Heur van et al., 2013). Instead of epistemological “perspectivism” we 
are being confronted with a cosmopolitan choice. Cosmopolitanism is the ability to per-
ceive and act in the presence of the complexity of the world (cosmos) which requires a 
specific disposition—“ecology of practices” (Latour, 2004; Stengers, 2010, VII). 
The ontologically determined cosmopolitan choice is the necessity to decide the path we 
choose, fully aware that with each choice we open the possibility of performing (enacting) 
a certain world, and we close and make it impossible to establish another one. This choice 
becomes “heavy,” from the responsibility as the weight of the stone placed on the goban 
(the board) during the game, the paths once chosen to determine further choices. It is no 
coincidence that most of the Go/Weiqi game time in is spent in its initial phase (joseki). 
Ecology of practices, ontonorms, cosmopolitics are different terms for an important con-
sequence of ontological turn (turns) in contemporary social sciences (especially the 
STS/ANT). Ontologies proposed by the researchers discussed above, but also the experi-
ence of Go/Weiqi players are a proposal of the world, which is a pluriversum, the dynamic 
world of struggling, self-organizing orders. Dynamic ontologies restore the unenchanted 
world to such an extent that one may risk the statement that we are dealing here with a 
return to some form of hylozoism, so visible during the game of Go/Weiqi with its meta-
phors: influences, interactions, forces. Ontology proposed by the ANT and Go/Weiqi 
teaches us that a choice is not only an epistemological cognitive operation but a necessarily 
entangled, situated participation in changing the collective. 
                                                          
4 This corresponds to the qualitative and ontological understanding of “heaviness” and “slowness” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 371). 
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